This
is a further reason we know Cardinal Siri was not pope.
It
is clear that Cardinal Siri was not pope (as a tiny group supposes).
Not only was his supposed “pontificate” invisible, but it would
have opposed the pontificate of the pope universally accepted by
Catholics.
This
further shows the impossibility of the Church being now in a papal
interregnum.
The
Church accepts Pope Francis as pope and accepted each of his
post-conciliar predecessors. This is one of many compelling reasons
why we know the Church is not in a papal interregnum because, when
the Church accepted each post-conciliar pope in his turn, each one
became the true pope (if he wasn’t pope already). St. Alphonsus de
Liguori, Verità
della Fede
Part
3, Ch.8, §9.
5. Rash Judgment: Concluding the Pope is a Formal
Heretic
Trying to escape the fact that the pope in the Vatican
is visible to all and is accepted as pope by virtually all Catholics,
a tiny group holds that no “real” Catholics exist besides the members
of their own tiny group. Thus, they assert that the pope in the
Vatican is not the “real” pope because he is not accepted as pope
by the “real” Catholics (who are exclusively members of their own
tiny group). Or alternatively, they assert that their own “pope”
(accepted only by their own tiny group) is visible to “all” Catholics
and accepted by “all” Catholics, because their tiny group is the
only group of “true” Catholics.
Therefore, in order to reach the result they seek,
this tiny group judges the 1.2 billion people who profess to be Catholic.
This tiny group decides that the Faith and morals of those 1.2 billion
people show they are not “real” Catholics.
Similarly, this tiny group also judges the pope in the Vatican and decides
that his Faith (and morals) show he is not “really” the pope.
The distinction between material heresy
and formal heresy.
It is true that many people who profess to be Catholics,
hold objective errors against the Catholic Faith. This problem
occurred in past centuries also, even if it is more common today than
in (at least some) past centuries. For example, a child might
believe that God has a body. Or an adult might profess the Pelagian
heresy (about grace and free will).
But we would not be forced to conclude that such
a person (who professed himself Catholic but has always held the Pelagian
heresy), has never really been Catholic. For a person ceases to
be Catholic when he holds a position against the Catholic Faith which he knows to be incompatible
with what he must believe in order to be Catholic.
If a man held the Pelagian heresy, but wrongly believed
that he held the Catholic Faith (concerning matters of grace and free
will), then that man would be a
material heretic.
That is, the man would hold the “material” of heresy (
i.e., a heretical opinion)
not knowing it was heresy.
But this man would not be a
formal heretic because
he would not know his position was against the teaching of the Catholic
Church (and God).
A formal heretic denies the formal aspect of Faith,
which is the authority of God. The material heretic denies only
the material aspect of Faith.
Here is how St. Thomas explains this distinction between the Faith’s
formal and material aspects:
If we consider, in the Faith, the formal aspect of the object,
it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the Faith of which we are speaking, does not assent to anything,
except because it is revealed by God. Hence, the mean [i.e., the middle term of the syllogism]
on which Faith is based is the Divine Truth [i.e., God’s authority].
If, however, we consider materially the things to which
Faith assents, they include not only God but also many other things ….
Summa, III, Q.1, a.1, Respondeo (emphasis and bracketed words
added).
In other words, the formal aspect of the Faith is God alone, because
God is the infallible authority of revealed Faith. The material
aspect includes many other things, e.g., our Lady’s Assumption into heaven,
because the material aspect of the Faith includes all the various revealed
truths of our Faith.
Definitions—In summary:
- A person is a formal heretic if he denies any part of the Catholic Faith in its formal aspect, i.e., if he denies any statement which he knows is revealed by the infallible teaching authority of the Church (God). Such denial involves rejecting the Church’s (God’s) infallible authority itself.
- A person is a material heretic only, if he denies a part of the Catholic Faith in its material aspect only. In other words, a material heretic is a person who denies a statement of the Catholic
Faith without knowing the Church (God) teaches that this statement is
infallibly true. Such material heretic’s denial does not involve rejection of the Church’s (God’s) infallible authority, because he errs about what the Church (God) teaches.
Thus, a material heretic can be a Catholic.
However, a formal heretic cannot be Catholic, because he rejects the
Church’s (God’s) authority by denying part of the Faith, knowing the Church (God)
teaches it.
Holding formal heresy always places a person into
the state of mortal sin and outside the Church, even if no one else
knows of the formal heresy. By contrast, holding material heresy
neither places a person in mortal sin nor outside the Church because
the person holds the error against the Faith blamelessly,
i.e., without knowing his opinion
is against the Faith.
Material heresy does not exclude someone from the
Church, no matter how public the heresy is, no matter how much harm
the heresy causes, and no matter how unshakably he professes it.
Thus, the very fact that a person professes a heretical opinion does
not, in itself, tell us if he is interiorly culpable for a sin against
the Faith. In other words, professing heresy does not, in itself,
tell us if the person is a formal heretic or if he is Catholic.
This distinction between formal heresy and material heresy, is a
matter of common sense and is the same type of distinction we make in
everyday life, between an objectively sinful act and interior culpability
for the sinful act.
When leaving a restaurant, suppose a man takes an
umbrella which does not belong to him but which he innocently believes
to be his own. He has committed an objectively sinful act of theft
(
i.e., wrongfully taking
someone else’s property), but interiorly he has not sinned.
Here is how the Summa Theologica explains that ignorance
can excuse a person from culpability for an act which is objectively
sinful:
An act is said to be excused … on the part of the agent, so that although the act be evil, it is not imputed
as sin to the agent, or [in the case of an agent who had some culpable
negligence] at least not as so grave a sin. Thus, ignorance is said to excuse
[interior culpability for] a sin wholly or partly.
Summa Supp., Q.49, a.4, Respondeo (emphasis and bracketed words
added).
There is no sin of theft on the man’s soul
(i.e., no interior culpability)
because taking the umbrella was an innocent mistake.
This man is like the material heretic, who innocently
believes a statement which is objectively false (
i.e., heresy). Thus,
the material heretic is objectively wrong but interiorly blameless for
the sin of heresy. By contrast, the formal heretic
knows he believes something
contrary to the Church’s (God’s) teaching, like a person who takes
someone else’s umbrella
knowing it is not his own.
The formal heretic is interiorly culpable for his heretical opinion.
Thus, people who profess heresy could be material
heretics only, or they could be formal heretics. If they profess
themselves to be Catholics and are material heretics only, their clinging
(however tightly and publicly) to objective heresy does not put them
outside the Church, since they do not deny the Church’s teaching, knowing the Church (God)
teaches the statement infallibly. Such material heretics are merely
Catholics who are mistaken about some aspect of the Faith.
By contrast, a person is outside the Church (and
is a formal heretic) who rejects a statement of the Faith in its formal
aspect, knowing the Church (God)
teaches the statement infallibly. This rejection is a rejection
of the Church’s (God’s) authority.
If we were to judge someone to be a formal heretic
(which always brings interior culpability for mortal sin), we would
be judging the sin on his soul, not merely judging that he made an objective
error against the Faith (which might be blameless). Judging someone
to be a formal heretic is to conclude that such a person really “knows”
he denies what the Church (God) teaches, but he won’t admit this “fact”.
We are not discussing the case of a non-Catholic
(
e.g., a Lutheran) who
denies a truth of the Catholic Faith and tells us (by his very adherence
to Lutheranism) that he is not Catholic and does not believe everything
the Catholic Church teaches. Instead, we are treating of a man
who
professes to be a Catholic
but denies part of the Catholic Faith.
It is Rash Judgment to Judge a
Person’s Interior Culpability
God wills men to know the unchanging truth especially
of the Faith, and this knowledge perfects our intellects. In other
words, truth makes our intellects good. In seeking the truth,
we should strive to be completely objective in knowing
things exactly as they
are.
Here is how St. Thomas explains this principle:
[W]hen we judge of things … there is question
of the good of the person who judges [viz., the good of his
intellect], if he judge truly, and of his evil [viz., of his intellect]
if he judge falsely, because the true is the good of the intellect,
and the false is its evil
, as stated in [Aristotle’s] Ethics, bk.6, ch.2.
Wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment accord with things as they are.
Summa, IIa IIae, Q.60, a.4, ad 2 (emphasis and bracketed
words added).
For this reason, when determining whether a particular
statement is against the Catholic Faith, we should judge the statement
with complete objectivity.
By contrast, when we judge the motives or culpability
of persons, we must judge in the best possible light, not with complete
“even-handed objectivity”.
This is true
even if we were usually wrong about such a person’s culpability.
Judgments about the culpability of our neighbor are singular, contingent
facts (in contrast to eternal, universal truth) and such singular facts
do not perfect our intellect.
It is better
to be usually wrong making too-favorable a judgment about a person’s
culpability than to be wrong even occasionally, making too negative
a judgment.
Here is how St. Thomas explains this important point:
It is one thing to judge of things and another to
judge of men. … [W]hen we judge of men, the good and evil
in our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the person about
whom judgment is being formed. For he is deemed worthy of honor
from the very fact that he is judged to be good, and deserving of contempt
if he is judged to be evil. For this reason we ought, in this
kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless the contrary
is proven. … [We] may happen to be deceived
more often than not. Yet it is better to err frequently through
thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less frequently through having
an evil opinion of a good man, because in the latter case an
injury is inflicted, but not in the former. … And though we may judge falsely, our
judgment in thinking well of another pertains to our goodwill toward
him and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither does it pertain
to the intellect’s perfection to know the truth of contingent singular
facts in themselves.
Summa, IIa IIae, Q.60, a.4, ad 1-2 (emphasis added).
Such an unproven, negative judgment about
a person’s culpability is called rash judgment. Summa, IIa IIae, Q.60,
a.2, Respondeo.
For this reason, when determining whether a person
is blamable for holding a heretical opinion, we should not
judge his interior culpability with complete objectivity but rather,
in the best possible light (if we judge at all). For, as St. Thomas
explains: Our Lord forbids rash judgment, which is about the inward
intention or other uncertain things, as Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte
ii, 18).
Summa, IIa IIae, Q.60,
a.2, ad 1.
If a man says he is a Catholic and that he believes
that a Catholic is permitted to hold the opinions he does, we should
judge him in the best possible light and not assume he “knows” his
position is contrary to the Catholic Faith, but won’t admit the “fact”.
Nor should we assume that, just because we are unsuccessful in changing
his opinion, that this means the man “knows” his position is contrary
to what he must believe in order to be Catholic.
Thus, it is good to judge objectively the errors
themselves, taught by Pope Francis (or others), because the truth of
statements should be judged objectively. But it is rash to judge
Pope Francis’s culpability with objective “even-handedness” and
assume he certainly “knows” that he holds heresy and thus, is not
“really” Catholic (and pope).
To the extent we judge Pope Francis’ interior culpability
at all, we must judge in the best possible light. Thus, we would
judge him to be a material heretic (not a formal heretic) and judge
him to still be Catholic (as he professes he is) and to still be the
pope (as he professes to be).
Similarly, whatever objective heresies are held by
the 1.2 billion people who profess to be Catholic, we should judge their
interior culpability in the best possible light (if we judge at all).
We should not conclude they are formal heretics and are not “real”
Catholics. Thus, their acceptance of Pope
Francis is an alternate
way to prove he is the pope.
See, section 4 above. When can We Conclude Someone is
a Formal Heretic?
We could conclude Pope Francis was a formal heretic
if he told
us that he did not believe what the Church (God) teaches, that a Catholic
must believe now. We would not
be judging him rashly because we would merely believe what he tells
us about himself.
However, it is rash to judge the interior culpability
of Pope
Francis (or anyone else) and conclude he is a formal heretic
simply because he is a material heretic,
i.e., has heretical opinions
and refuses to be corrected by traditional Catholics.
Protecting Ourselves from Evil
without Judging Interior Culpability
Of course, even when we judge someone not
be a formal heretic (if we judge him at all), this does not mean we
should accept him as our child’s catechism teacher. For our
child would be harmed by his errors, however interiorly blameless the
man might be for professing his heresy.
Without judging someone’s interior culpability,
we should take into account the person’s wrong-doing (which we must
judge objectively). For, when a man is prone to take other people’s
umbrellas, we should keep a close eye on our own umbrella (when he is
present) even if he innocently took the other umbrellas in the past.
Likewise, we should warn people not to attend sermons
of a particular priest who professes errors against the Faith, even
if he teaches these errors innocently. We should be wary and warn
others, simply based on the priest’s proneness to teach error, whether
he is culpable or not.
Judging any person to be interiorly culpable for
his sinful act only results in concluding his soul is lower with regards
to our own soul, than would be true if he were not culpable. Summa, IIa IIae, Q.60,
a.4, ad 2. But our rashly judging his interior culpability does not allow
us to protect ourselves any better than if we didn’t judge him.
But isn’t it “Obvious” that
Pope Francis is a Formal Heretic?
But “rash judgers” will exclaim that it is “obvious”
that the man (in the example above) knows he is taking someone else’s
umbrella (and is interiorly culpable), because his own umbrella is a
different color or because he did not bring his own umbrella with him
today,
etc. Notice the
hidden assumptions in the “rash judger’s” conclusion. He
assumes that the “umbrella thief” remembers which umbrella he brought
today,
etc. St. Thomas
replies about such rash judgment: “it is better to err frequently
through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less frequently through
having an evil opinion of a good man”.
Summa, IIa IIae, Q.60,
a.4, ad 1.
Similarly, “rash judgers” say the pope is “obviously”
a formal heretic. They say he “must” know he denies Church
teaching because he was trained in the Catholic Faith before Vatican
II or that his errors have been pointed out to him,
etc. Notice the
hidden assumptions in the “rash judger’s” conclusion. He
assumes that the “heretic” had a good (or at least an average) Catholic
education,
etc. St. Thomas
replies to these “rash judgers” that we must not judge based on
such probabilities and assumptions.
Summa, IIa IIae, Q.60,
a.4, ad 1.
We are not obliged to search for an explanation of
how the pope (or anyone else) might not be blamable for whatever objective
heresy he holds. The members of the post-Vatican II hierarchy
are not stupid, but they received an extremely bad philosophical formation,
including the principle (which is at the root of modernism) that all
truth evolves. By contrast, all correct reasoning (and the Catholic
Faith) rely on the philosophical principle that there is eternal, unchanging
truth.
In his masterful treatment of modernism, St. Pius X explained that
modernists profess that all truth changes:
[T]hey have reached that pitch of folly at which they
pervert the eternal concept of truth …. [They say] dogma is not only able, but ought to evolve and to be changed.
… Thus far, Venerable Brethren, We have considered the Modernist
as a philosopher.
Pascendi Dominici Gregis, Pope St. Pius X, September 8, 1907, §§13-14.
Thus, because of bad philosophy, modernists
think a dogma used to be true (and used to be taught by the Church)
but is no longer true or taught by the Church. This explains why
the present hierarchy treats the Church’s past teaching, not as false at the previous time,
but as “obsolete” or no longer binding. For example, Cardinal
Ratzinger treated the (truly infallible) teachings in the syllabi of
Pope Pius IX and Pope St. Pius X as if they were now-outdated and no
longer true. He says that:
[T]here are decisions of the Magisterium that cannot
be a last word on the matter as such, but are, in a substantial fixation
of the problem, above all an expression of pastoral prudence, a kind
of provisional disposition. Its nucleus remains valid, but the
particulars, which the circumstances of the times have influenced, may
need further ramifications. In this regard, one may think of the declarations
of popes in the last century about religious liberty, as well as the
anti-Modernist decisions at the beginning of this century, above
all, the decisions of the Biblical Commission of the time. As a cry of alarm in the face
of hasty and superficial adaptations, they will remain fully justified.
A personage such as Johann Baptist Metz said, for example, that the
Church’s anti-Modernist decisions render the great service of preserving
her from immersion in the liberal-bourgeois world. But in the details of the determinations
they contain, they become obsolete after having fulfilled their pastoral
mission at the proper moment.
Cardinal Ratzinger, June 27 1990 L’Osservatore Romano,
p.6 (emphasis added).
Again, we are not obliged to search for an explanation
of how post-Vatican II Catholics (including the pope) avoid being formal
heretics. It suffices that we judge them (if at all) in the most
favorable light. Even if a modernist were absolutely clear
in denying a dogma (such as our Lady’s Assumption), it would not necessarily
mean he was a formal heretic and he ceased to be Catholic.
This is true even assuming that he knows the Church defined the Assumption
as a dogma. For a modernist could think the particular dogma had been true and Catholics used to be required to
believe it, but that this particular truth has changed.
Such changeability of truth is a philosophical error underlying
modernism. However, the unchangeability of truth is not itself
a dogma of the Faith. Of course, the philosophical principle
that truth does not change, underlies Church dogma and all natural truth.
A person who holds a (materially) heretical position does not become
a formal heretic unless he knows that the Catholic Church not only used to
teach a particular dogma, but still teaches
it and that we must believe it now, in order to be Catholic now.
A modernist could think that Catholics of a past
age would have been required to be martyred rather than deny a particular
dogma even though that “former” dogma is now no longer even true.
The
false philosophy underlying
modernism corrodes the mind but can be one of many reasons why various
modernists are material heretics but not formal heretics. For
us, though,
it is better to err frequently through thinking well
of a wicked man, than to err less frequently through having an evil
opinion of a good man
.
Summa, IIa IIae, Q.60,
a.4, ad 1.
A Superior who Punishes his Subordinate
in the External Forum, for the Good of the Community, is not thereby
Judging Rashly
Civil and ecclesiastical authorities cannot read
the interior souls of their subordinates any more than parents can read
the souls of their children. But because these authorities have
a special duty to care for the community over which they have charge,
they have a duty to punish the wrong-doing of their subordinates, for
the good of the whole community.
Here is how St. Thomas explains this principle:
[J]ust as a law cannot be made save by public authority,
so neither can a judgment be pronounced except by public authority,
which extends over those who are subject to the community [i.e., subject to the particular
public authority]. Wherefore, even as it would be unjust for one man
to force another to observe a law that was not approved by public authority,
so too it is unjust, if a man compels another to submit to a judgment
that is pronounced by anyone other than the public authority.
Summa, IIa IIae, Q.60, a.6, respondeo.
They must use their best efforts to administer
justice, although they could be wrong in their particular judgments.
God will judge them according to their efforts.
Thus, a civil judge has a duty to punish murderers
(and other criminals), although it is possible for him to be mistaken
in his judgment. The judge is judging outwardly,
i.e., in the external
forum. He must do the best he can, and judges based on the evidence
in front of him.
Similarly, Church authorities have a duty to protect
the community over which they have been placed, although they could
be mistaken in their judgments. These authorities must punish
persons who spread heresy even though these authorities could be mistaken,
just as a civil judge could be mistaken. Among other punishments,
a superior can separate from the flock (excommunicate) the person who
spreads heresy. Of course, the easiest way for a superior to protect
his flock, is often to try to convince the material heretic that he
is wrong, rather than inflict punishment.
Here is how St. Pius X explains the duty of ecclesiastical
superiors to judge in the external forum and punish their subordinates’
evil deeds, even though the subordinate might not be
interiorly culpable for
any sin:
Although they [the Modernists] express their astonishment
that We should number them amongst the enemies of the Church, no one
will be reasonably surprised that We should do so, if, leaving out
of account the internal disposition of the soul, of which God alone
is the Judge, he considers their doctrines, their manner of speech,
and their actions [which are the outward, objective criteria upon which
a man judges in the external forum].
Pascendi, St. Pope Pius X, §3 (emphasis and bracketed words added).
Thus, as St. Pius X explains, a superior might be
mistaken about the internal disposition of the
soul, of which God alone is the Judge
but nonetheless, the
superior must protect the community over which he has authority, by
judging the outward conduct of wrong-doers under him (and punishing,
where necessary).
Sedevacantism is Schism
Schismatics are
those who refuse to submit to
the Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold communion with those members of the
Church who acknowledge his supremacy.
Summa, IIa IIae, Q.39,
a.1,
respondeo. That is what sedevacantists
do,
viz., they refuse to submit
to the current pope, asserting that he has no authority over them because
he is not “really” the pope.
We should not confuse the sin of schism (which is
refusing submission to the authority of the
current pope), with the
sin of heresy,
viz., rejecting as a matter
of principle the authority possessed by the papal office (
e.g., that a pope is infallible
when speaking
ex cathedra).
Here is how St. Thomas explains this distinction:
Heresy and schism are distinguished in respect of those things to which each is opposed essentially and directly. For heresy is essentially opposed to faith, while schism is essentially opposed to the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Wherefore, just as faith and charity are different virtues, although whoever lacks faith lacks charity, so too schism and heresy are different vices, although whoever is a heretic is also a schismatic, but not conversely. This is what Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians: I consider the difference between schism and heresy to be that heresy holds false doctrine while schism severs a man from the Church.
Summa, IIa IIae, Q.39, a.1, ad 3.
In contrast to the course taken by sedevacantists,
traditional Catholics have a duty to recognize that the current pope
has authority over us. Even though we frequently cannot do what
the pope commands us, we must
acknowledge his supremacy,
as St.
Thomas teaches we must.
Summa, IIa IIae, Q.39,
a.1,
Respondeo. We do
what the pope commands us to do, if we can do so in good conscience.
Thus, for example, if Pope
Francis commanded Catholics to recite at
least five decades of the rosary each day, under pain of sin, we would
be bound in conscience to do this, under pain of sin.
Thus,
schism severs a man from the Church.
Summa, IIa IIae, Q.39,
a.1, ad 3 (quoting St. Jerome). But when a man holds this false
position that we have no pope, he does so either culpably (
i.e., he “knows better”)
or it is an innocent error. If the sedevacantist is blameless
for his error, then he has no interior culpability (no sin on his soul),
like the man who commits the objective act of theft by innocently (although
wrongfully) taking someone else’s umbrella.
So sedevacantism is always an act of schism.
But it is material schism only, if the particular sedevacantist is not
interiorly culpable for his false opinion that we have no pope.
By contrast, the sedevacantist is a formal schismatic, if he has interior
culpability because he truly “knows better”. This distinction
(between material and formal schism) is analogous to the distinction
between material and formal heresy.
For the reasons set forth above (concerning the sin
of rash judgment), we must not judge particular sedevacantists to be
formal schismatics, unless they tell us they are schismatics (in which
case, we would merely believe them). But, if we judge individual
sedevacantists at all, we must judge them in the best possible light,
even if we would err frequently through thinking well of
them. Summa, IIa IIae, Q.60,
a.4, ad 1.
The Common Root of Schism and
Rash Judgment, is not an Accident
As St. Thomas teaches, schism is a sin against charity. Summa, IIa IIae, Q.39,
a.1, ad 3, (quoted above).
Rash judgment also, is a sin against charity.
One way to see this is true, is that we would want our neighbor to judge
us (if at all) in the best possible light. If we do not judge
our neighbor this same way, we fail to “do unto others”, as we would
have them “do unto” us. Matt. 7:12. Thus, we are not loving and treating our neighbor as ourselves, as required by the Second Great Commandment. Matt. 22:39.
Further, our judgments should always be made with
a habit of charity.
Summa, Q.60, a.4, respondeo & a.2, ad
1. We must judge our neighbor (if at all) according to
our goodwill toward him,
ready to believe the best of him. Summa, IIa IIae, Q.60,
a.4, ad 2. For charity believeth all things
. 1 Cor.
13: 7. Our Lord forbids judgment which proceeds not from benevolence
but from bitterness of heart.
Summa, Q.60, a.2, ad 1.
Although we do not judge the interior culpability
of particular sedevacantists, it is not by chance that schism and rash
judgment are both, at their root, sins against charity. This connection
is no more by chance than the fact that gluttons tend to commit other
kinds of sins connected to gluttony, such as pampering their flesh through
inordinate attachment to bodily comfort. (These connections between
sins are objectively true, regardless of a particular person’s culpability.)
Summary
A person could profess heresy but still be Catholic,
if he were a material heretic only. We must not judge a man’s
interior culpability. Therefore we must not judge a man to be
a formal heretic if he professes to be Catholic and says he believes
what a Catholic must believe now, in order to be Catholic now.
We must judge in the most favorable light (if at all) the interior culpability
of the pope or the 1.2 billion people who profess to be Catholic.
We must not judge they are not “real” Catholics.
Thus, we must judge Pope
Francis to be a material
heretic, not a formal heretic, and that he is the pope. We must
judge (if at all) that the 1.2 billion people who profess to be Catholic,
are material heretics. Thus, their acceptance of Pope
Francis
is a further proof he is pope.
See, section 4 above.Finally, sedevacantists are in schism—material
or formal—depending on whether they are culpable for their error.
6. Sedevacantism is Un-Catholic because it is Revolutionary
When someone in authority commands something evil,
it is one thing to refuse to consent to that superior’s command, but
it is a further step to use that evil command as a basis for rejecting
the ruler’s authority as such. This further
step is to revolt.
For example, the American revolutionaries considered
it evil that King George III imposed taxes on them without their consent
and did many other things to which they objected. But the American
revolutionaries not only refused such commands of King George but also
used the commands as a (purported) justification for revolution.
In their Declaration of Independence,
the revolutionaries objected to many things such as their king quartering
large bodies of armed troops among us
; imposing taxes on us without
our consent
; and depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of
trial by jury
.
After listing their grievances, the American revolutionaries
then did what all revolutionaries do: they said that their ruler was
to blame for their own revolution because his conduct caused him to
lose his status as their king. The American revolutionaries declared
that King George III whose character is thus marked by every act
which may define a tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.
The American revolutionaries then did something else
which revolutionaries always do: they declared that it was their right
(or duty) to revolt:
[W]hen a long train of abuses and usurpations …
evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is [the
colonies’] right, it is their duty, to throw off such government.
Finally, the American revolutionaries did more that
revolutionaries always do: they declared that their ruler has lost all
authority over them:
[T]hese United Colonies are, and of right ought to
be free and independent states; that they are absolved from all allegiance
to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them
and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved.
This is what it is for a person to be a revolutionary:
to reject not just particular (perhaps evil) commands but to also reject
the very authority of his ruler.
The American revolutionaries followed the same pattern
as countless other revolutionaries,
e.g., in France, Russia,
Latin America, and by the Protestant revolutionaries.
In all human history—civil as well as religious—there is
not even one revolution
which the Catholic Church recognizes to have been praiseworthy and not
sinful.
Generally, political revolt is called by the name
“sedition” and revolt against the Church, by the name “schism”.
But at the root of all such revolts, there is the same “non serviam!” which echoes that of Satan, the father of all revolutionaries.
In summary, revolutionaries follow a common pattern:
- they assert that their ruler committed wrongs (actual or merely imagined); and then
- they use such wrongs as a basis to declare that their ruler’s own conduct has resulted in his losing his authority to rule them.
The Cristeros were Not Revolutionaries
On a superficial level, a person might have the false
impression that the Mexican Cristeros were revolutionaries because they
took up arms against their government. But the Cristeros’ goal
was to defend their priests, their churches and the Catholicism of their
families. The Cristeros resisted the many wrongs committed by
their anti-Catholic government. But unlike revolutionaries, the
Cristeros did not use such wrongs as a basis to declare that their government
had lost all authority over them.
Sedevacantists are Revolutionaries
Unlike the Cristeros, sedevacantists are revolutionaries.
Sedevacantists correctly recognize that the pope has committed many
wrongs. Instead of resisting only the wrongs committed by the
pope, they follow the pattern of other revolutionaries by using these
wrongs as a basis for rejecting the pope’s authority as such.
Like other revolutionaries, they blame the pope for their own revolt,
saying that his words and actions have caused him to lose his authority
over them.
Some sedevacantists vainly attempt to avoid their
status as revolutionaries, by saying they are not revolting against
any ruler (the pope) because his conduct makes him not their real ruler
(pope). But they fail to see how they beg the question, just like
any American revolutionaries who might have said they are not revolting
against their ruler (King George) because his conduct makes him not
their real ruler. Such circular “reasoning” merely assumes
their conclusion as a premise for their “argument” that they are not revolutionaries. In other words, they claim that they do not deny the authority of the ruler over
them because they deny he has the authority of the ruler over them.
Of course, the Church is several rulers (popes) past
the beginning of the sedevacantist revolution. Having revolted
against Pope John XXIII, sedevacantists now take as a “matter of course”
the rejection of the current pope’s authority, just as the American
Revolutionaries took as a “matter of course” that King George III’s
successors had no authority over them.
A person might wrongly believe that sedevacantists
are not revolutionaries, based on the superficial supposition that revolution
must involve physical fighting. But what is essential to revolution
is for persons to declare that their ruler has lost his authority to
rule them. A revolution need not involve physical fighting.
For example, the Hawaiian Revolution of 1893 did not involve any physical
fighting. Likewise, any physical fighting was not essential to
the Protestant Revolution against the Catholic Church.
Also, a person might wrongly believe sedevacantism
is not revolutionary, based on the superficial supposition that revolution
must involve deposing a ruler from his throne or office. However,
what is essential to revolution is the rejection of a ruler’s authority,
but this might pertain to only certain persons or places. For
example, in the American Revolution, the colonists did not cause King
George III to lose his throne entirely. They succeeded merely
in revolting against his authority in the thirteen American colonies.
Similarly, the Protestant Revolution did not depose the pope from his
throne but the Protestant revolutionaries merely rejected his authority
among certain persons or places.
Revolution is Always Wrong
It is un-Catholic to be a revolutionary. All
authority comes from God, regardless of the method by which a ruler
is chosen to wield civil or religious power. St. Paul taught:
[T]here is no power but from God: and those
[powers] that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth
the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. And they that resist, purchase
to themselves damnation. … For [the ruler] is God’s minister.
… Wherefore be subject of necessity,
not only for [the ruler’s] wrath, but also for conscience’s sake.
Romans, 13:1-2, 4-5 (emphasis added).
Pope Pius IX faithfully echoed St. Paul:
[A]ll authority comes from God. Whoever resists authority
resists the ordering made by God Himself, consequently achieving his
own condemnation; disobeying authority is always sinful except when
an order is given which is opposed to the laws of God and the Church.
Qui Pluribus, November 9, 1846, §22.
Pope Pius IX taught this same doctrine in his infallible condemnation
of the following proposition:
It is permissible to refuse obedience to legitimate rulers, and even to revolt against them.
Quanta Cura, proposition #63 (emphasis added).
Pope Pius IX used his ex cathedra (infallible) authority to condemn
this error as part of a list of errors contained in the syllabus of Quanta Cura. Regarding these condemnations,
the pope said:
We, truly mindful of Our Apostolic duty, and especially solicitous
about our most holy religion, about sound doctrine and the salvation
of souls divinely entrusted to Us, and about the good of human society
itself, have decided to lift our voice again. And so all and each
evil opinion and doctrine individually mentioned in this letter, by
Our Apostolic authority We reject, proscribe and condemn; and We wish
and command that they be considered as absolutely rejected, proscribed
and condemned by all the sons of the Catholic Church.
Thus, Pope Pius IX’s condemnation fulfills the conditions for infallibility
set out in Vatican I’s document, Pastor Aeternus, because the pope was:
1) carrying out his duty as pastor and teacher of all Christians; 2)
in accordance with his supreme apostolic authority; 3) on a matter of
faith or morals; 4) to be held by the universal Church.
Pope Leo XIII taught the same doctrine as St. Paul
and Pope Pius IX:
If, however, it should ever happen that public power
is exercised by rulers rashly and beyond measure, the doctrine of the Catholic Church
does not permit rising up against them on one’s own terms,
lest quiet and order be more and more disturbed, or lest society receive
greater harm therefrom.
Encyclical, Quod Apostolici muneris,
December 28, 1878, §7 (emphasis added).
Because it is sinful to even willfully desire to
sin, Pope Leo XIII taught that even the “desire for revolution”
is a “vice”. Auspicato Concessu, §24.
Although revolution is forbidden, Pope Leo XIII gave
us the remedies of patience, prayer and resistance to the particular evil commands
of a bad ruler:
Whenever matters have come to such a pass that no
other hope of a solution is evident, [the doctrine of the Catholic Church]
teaches that a remedy is to be hastened through the merits of Christian
patience, and by urgent prayers to God.
But if the decisions of legislators and rulers should
sanction or order something that is contrary to divine and natural law,
the dignity and duty of the Christian name and the opinion of the apostles
urge that we ought to obey God, rather than men
(Acts 5:29).
Quod Apostolici muneris, December 28, 1878, §7 (bracketed
words added).
St. Thomas offers the same remedy to persons who
suffer the evil of a bad ruler:
[S]ometimes God permits evil rulers to afflict good
men. This affliction is for the good of such good men, as St.
Paul says above (Rom. 8:28): All things work for the good, for those
who love God.
Commentary on Romans, ch.13, lect.1.
The Example of the Saints shows
Revolution is Wrong
Look at the example of Catholics, including great
saints like St. Sebastian, who served bravely and faithfully even in
the army of the pagan emperors of Rome. They did not revolt, even
when their emperor openly sought to kill all Catholics.
Here is Pope Gregory XVI’s praise for the Catholics
of the Roman Empire, who were faithful to God first but also to their
emperor (whenever the emperor’s commands were not themselves evil):
[T]he early Christians … deserved well of the emperors
and of the safety of the state even while persecution raged. This they
proved splendidly by their fidelity in performing perfectly and promptly
whatever they were commanded which was not opposed to their religion,
and even more by their constancy and the shedding of their blood in
battle. Christian soldiers
, says St. Augustine, served an infidel
emperor. When the issue of Christ was raised, they acknowledged
no one but the One who is in heaven. They distinguished the eternal
Lord from the temporal lord, but were also subject to the temporal
lord for the sake of the eternal Lord.
St. Mauritius, the unconquered martyr and leader
of the Theban legion had this in mind when, as St. Eucharius reports,
he answered the emperor in these words: We are your soldiers, Emperor,
but also servants of God, and this we confess freely . . . and now this final necessity of life
has not driven us into rebellion.
…
Indeed the faith of the early Christians shines more
brightly, if we consider with Tertullian, that since the Christians
were not lacking in numbers and in troops, they could have acted as
foreign enemies. We are but of yesterday
, he says, yet
we have filled all your cities, islands, fortresses, municipalities,
assembly places, the camps themselves, the tribes, the divisions, the
palace, the senate, the forum. … For what war should we
not have been fit and ready even if unequal in forces—we who are
so glad to be cut to pieces—were it not, of course, that in our doctrine we would have
been permitted more to be killed rather than to kill? …
[Y]ou have fewer enemies because of the multitude of Christians.
These beautiful examples of the
unchanging subjection to the rulers necessarily proceeded from the most
holy precepts of the Christian religion.
Encyclical Mirari Vos, August 15,
1832, §§ 18-19 (emphasis added), quoting and relying on the
teaching of St. Augustine (Doctor and Father of the Church), as well
as St. Mauritius and Tertullian (Father of the Church).
Prohibition against All Revolution,
Especially Forbids Rebellion against the Pope’s Authority as such
Since the Catholic Church’s ruler, above all others,
has authority from God, the sin of revolution most especially applies
to revolt against the pope’s authority, as such.
Thus, St. Robert Bellarmine explains that it is
licit to resist the Pontiff who … tries to destroy the Church. I say that it is licit
to resist him by not doing what he orders and by impeding the execution
of his will; it is not licit, however, to judge him, to punish him, or
depose him, for these are acts proper to a superior.
De Summo pontifice Book
II, ch. 29 (emphasis added).
Sedevacantism is an Oversimplification
Addis & Arnold characterize the traits of revolutionaries
in this way:
The methods of the Gospel are not revolutionary;
they do not deal in those sweeping general assertions
which fuller experience always shows to be but half truths.
A Catholic Dictionary, Addis & Arnold, The Catholic Publication Society,
New York, 1884, pp.767-68 (emphasis added).
The sedevacantist exhibits such revolutionary traits.
He “leaps” from the truth that the pope has done much evil, to the
declaration that we have no pope. Thus, the sedevacantist oversimplifies
the truth through sweeping general assertion and half-truth about his
ruler.
Conclusion
Without judging sedevacantists’ interior culpability,
it is nonetheless plain that sedevacantists follow the objectively sinful
pattern of revolutionaries. They assert that the wrongs committed
by their ruler are (purported) justification for declaring their ruler
has lost his authority to rule them.
7. Our Catholic Duty: Resist the Harm Done by a Bad
Pope But (Of Course) Recognize His
Authority
Two different mortal sins prevent an informed Catholic
from being a sedevacantist:
- If we rashly judge the pope to be a formal heretic because he is a material heretic, this is a mortal sin (because it is the sin of rash judgment on a grave
matter). See, Section 5 above.
- If we revolt against the pope’s authority as such, this is a mortal sin of revolution. See, Section 6 above.
Therefore, because Catholics must neither be rash-judgers
nor revolutionaries, we must recognize the authority of the pope who
is in the Vatican.
Although Recognizing the Pope’s
Authority, We must also Recognize His Evil Conduct
When judging a person’s interior culpability, it
must be done (if at all) in the most favorable light. By contrast, we judge a person’s statements
and actions objectively and we must resist objective evil and error,
however blameless its proponent might be. Summa, IIa IIae, Q.60,
a.4, ad 2.
Thus, we assume the best (if we assume anything)
about the pope’s interior, subjective culpability, but we also must
recognize that the current pope’s words and deeds are often objectively
evil.
True Obedience is Subordinate
to Faith and Must Conform to Faith
The virtue of obedience is a subordinate virtue under
the Cardinal Virtue of Justice. Summa, IIa IIae, Q.104.
a2. Faith and Charity are superior. Summa, IIa IIae, Q.4 a.7 sed cont. & ad 3;
IIa IIae, Q.23 a.6.
Because obedience is subordinate to Faith, the Apostles
told the Jews that we ought to obey God, rather than men.
Acts, 5:29.
Pope Leo XIII faithfully echoed the Apostles in teaching
this truth:
[W]here a law is enacted contrary to reason, or to
the eternal law, or to some ordinance of God, obedience is unlawful,
lest, while obeying man, we become disobedient to God.
Libertas Praestantissimum, §§ 11 & 13.
For this reason, anyone who obeys the sinful command
of his superior, commits the sin of disobedience to God’s law.
Summa, IIa IIae, Q.33,
a.7, ad.5 (…ipse peccaret praecipiens,
et ei obediens, quasi contra praeceptum Domini agens…
).
But What Should We Do, While the
Pope Harms the Church (in Her Human Element)?
When a superior (
e.g., the pope) commands
that we do something wrong (including the instruction to believe something
false), the Catholic response is:
We resist! This is why Pope
St. Gregory the Great taught:
Know that evil ought never to be done
through obedience, though sometimes something good, which is being done,
ought to be discontinued out of obedience.
De Moral., bk. XXXV, §29 (emphasis added).
When we resist a superior’s sinful conduct (or
command), we do not thereby reject the superior’s authority as such,
but only his evil conduct (or command). St. Thomas made this crucial
distinction when he discussed St. Paul resisting St. Peter, the first
pope, to his face. Galatians, 2:11. St. Thomas explained
that the Apostle opposed Peter in the exercise of
authority, not in his authority of ruling.
Super Epistulas S. Pauli, Ad
Galatas, ch.2 lectio III (emphasis added).
The Duty to Resist a Pope’s
Abuse of Authority, Pertains to Matters of Faith and Morals as well
The principle of resisting any superior’s evil
command, applies to any
evil command—whether to do something, to say something or to believe
something.
Thus, a pope might command us to believe his errors
on matters of Faith. The pope can make such errors whenever he
is not speaking ex cathedra. The
First Vatican Council carefully listed the conditions for papal infallibility,
because only when the pope fulfills all of the conditions, is he infallibly prevented
from erring on matters of Faith or morals. At any other time,
the pope might err on those matters, triggering a Catholic’s duty
to resist the error.
In A Catholic Dictionary,
Addis & Arnold explain:
Even when he [
viz., the pope] speaks
with Apostolic Authority [which is only
one
of the conditions for papal infallibility], he may err. The Vatican
Council only requires us to believe that God protects him from error
in definitions on faith or morals when he imposes a belief on the Universal
Church.
A Catholic Dictionary, under the topic “Pope”, Addis & Arnold,
The Catholic Publication Society, New York, 1884, pp.767-68 (bracketed
comments added).
St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that, when St. Paul resisted
St. Peter to the face [Galatians, 2:11], the impending danger of
scandal
St. Peter caused, was with respect to the Faith.
Summa, IIa IIae, Q.33,
a.4, ad 2.
Pope Paul IV tells us we are right to resist the
pope whenever he deviates from the Faith:
[T]he Roman Pontiff, who is the representative upon
earth of our God and Lord Jesus Christ, who holds the fullness of power
over peoples and kingdoms, who may judge all and be judged by none in
this world, may nonetheless be contradicted if he be found to
have deviated from the Faith.
Cum Ex Apostolatus Officio, §1 (emphasis added).
Likewise, St. Robert Bellarmine assures us that we
are right to resist a pope who uses his office to attack souls (whether
through false doctrine or bad morals):
Just as it is licit
to resist a Pontiff who attacks the body, so also is it licit
to resist him who attacks
souls or destroys the civil order or above all, tries to destroy
the Church. I say that it is licit to resist him by not doing
what he orders and by impeding the execution of his will. It is not
licit, however, to judge, to punish, or to depose him, for these are
acts proper to a superior.
De Romano Pontifice, St. Robert Bellarmine, Bk.2, ch.29 (emphasis added).
St. Thomas explains the reason for this distinction
St. Robert Bellarmine makes,
viz., that we are right
to resist (correct) the pope or other superior, but we cannot punish
or depose him:
A subordinate is not competent to administer to his
prelate the correction which is an act of justice through the coercive
nature of punishment. But the fraternal correction which is an
act of charity is within the competency of everyone in respect of any
person towards whom he is bound by charity, provided there be something
in that person which requires correction.
Summa, IIa IIae, Q.33, a. 4, respondeo.
Juan Cardinal de Torquemada (revered medieval theologian
responsible for the formulation of the doctrines that were defined at
the Council of Florence) teaches:
It is necessary to obey God rather than men.
Therefore, where the Pope would command something contrary to Sacred
Scripture, or to an article of Faith, or to the truth of the Sacraments,
or to a command of the Natural Law or of the Divine Law, he ought not
to be obeyed, but such command ought to be despised.
Summa de Ecclesia, bk.2, ch.49, p.163B.
Conclusion
Because Catholics must not be rash-judgers or revolutionaries,
we recognize the authority of the pope. But because we must obey
God rather than men when they abuse their authority, we must resist
a bad pope when he does harm.
8. Judging the Pope’s Words & Deeds According to Catholic Tradition
It
is (objectively) a mortal sin of rash judgment for a person to decide
that the pope is a formal heretic.
See
Section 5 above. It is (objectively) a mortal sin of revolution for
a person to declare the pope has lost his authority
as
such.
See
Section 6 above.On
the other hand, it is also clear that we have a duty to resist the
pope’s errors and the harm he causes.
See
Section 7 above.However,
we are not Church Doctors or popes. How do we know what is true (and
what to believe), unless we simply believe whatever the pope teaches
us? But on the other hand, if we do not decide for ourselves what to
believe, then how do we know when we have a duty to resist what the
pope says or does?
One
false argument many sedevacantists use, is to present the following
false alternatives:
- Either
you must deny the authority of the pope in the Vatican (as they do);
- Or
you must accept everything
he does and says. Because (these sedevacantists say), if he were
pope and you pick and choose what you accept from him, then (they
say) it shows you have a protestant mentality (of picking and
choosing).
This
sedevacantist “argument” relies on a false understanding of papal
infallibility.
The
pope’s ex
cathedra
infallibility
We
know the pope’s words are infallible (
viz.,
from
the very fact that he utters them),
only
when he
speaks
ex
cathedra,
that is, when:
- in
the exercise of his office as shepherd and teacher of all
Christians,
- in
virtue of his supreme apostolic authority,
- he
defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals,
to
be held by the whole church.
Dogmatic
definition quoted from Vatican I, Session 4, ch.4. (We will treat
elsewhere concerning the teachings of a Church Council.)
Here
is an example of Pope
Pius IX speaking ex
cathedra,
fulfilling
these conditions, in
Quanta
Cura
(with its syllabus of errors):
We,
truly mindful of Our Apostolic duty, and especially solicitous about
our most holy religion, about sound doctrine and the salvation of
souls divinely entrusted to Us, and about the good of human society
itself, have decided to lift our voice again. And so all and each
evil opinion and doctrine individually mentioned in this letter, by
Our Apostolic authority, We reject, proscribe and condemn; and We
wish and command that they be considered as absolutely rejected,
proscribed and condemned by all the sons of the Catholic Church.
The
post-conciliar popes have taught nothing false which fulfills these
rigid conditions for ex
cathedra
infallibility.
Popes
can err in all other teachings
Popes
can err in any other teachings, unless those teachings are themselves
a faithful repetition of truth contained in infallible Catholic
Tradition. No pope (or anyone else) can err when faithfully
repeating the teachings of Catholic Tradition.
But
popes cannot teach any new doctrine infallibly. As the
First
Vatican Council declared: the Holy Ghost was promised to the
successors of Peter not
so that they might, by His revelation, make known some new
doctrine
.
Vatican I, Session 4, ch.4 (emphasis added).
We
must measure all doctrine according to its fidelity to Catholic
Tradition
Catholic
catechisms distinguish between the pope’s infallible and
non-infallible teachings because infallible teachings cannot conflict
with the Catholic Faith (but rather, are part of it), whereas
non-infallible teachings might conflict with the Catholic Faith.
This distinction warns Catholics to accept all infallible teachings
without possibility of error, but to accept the non-infallible ones
only provided that they do not conflict with Catholic Tradition,
i.e.,
the consistent teachings of the Catholic Church through the ages.
This
distinction (between the pope’s infallible and non-infallible
teachings) also shows that Catholics must both understand their Faith
and measure other teachings against that standard (
viz.,
infallible Catholic Tradition).
This
is why St. Paul instructed his flock to hold fast to the
traditions which you have learned, whether by word, or by our
epistle.
2 Thess., 2:14. St. Paul is telling Catholics to
measure all doctrine according to Catholic Tradition.
St.
Paul further warned his flock to reject all new or different
doctrines, which do not fit with the Tradition he taught them: If
anyone preach to you a gospel, besides that which you have received,
let him be anathema
. Galatians,
1:9.
In
the year 434, St. Vincent Lerins, gave
this same rule to all Catholics:
viz.,
to adhere to Catholic Tradition and reject what is contrary:
[I]n
the Catholic Church itself, all possible care must be taken, that we
hold that faith which has been believed everywhere, always, by all.
For that is truly and in the strictest sense “Catholic” ….
[I]f
some new contagion were to try to poison no longer a small part of
the Church, but all of the Church at the same time, then [a Catholic]
will
take the greatest care to attach himself to antiquity which,
obviously, can no longer be seduced by any lying novelty.
The
post-conciliar popes—like all popes—have the duty to teach
the Faith. If the present pope were to teach doctrine with all of
the conditions of ex
cathedra
infallibility (as set forth in Vatican I), then this teaching would
be infallible.
It
is true that traditional Catholics approach a post-conciliar pope’s
teaching with much greater wariness than they do the teaching of Pope
St. Pius X. There is good reason for this wariness. It is not that
a post-conciliar pope is not pope. But faithful Catholics approach
his teachings warily, like a child would approach his own father who
in the past has attempted to lead the child into sin. The father has
not ceased to be the child’s father (with a father’s authority),
but it is good and reasonable for the child to be more wary about his
father who has attempted to lead the child into sin in the past, as
compared to the lack of such reserve in the child who has a saintly
father.
So
a true Catholic does not refuse submission to the pope’s authority
but must refuse to “obey” the pope’s abuse of his authority.
If the pope is bad enough, it might appear that there is hardly
anything in which the pope should be obeyed. In this way, there
might be the superficial appearance that faithful Catholics and
sedevacantists have the same position. But this appearance is wrong.
Faithful Catholics do not forget the pope is their superior, even
when they cannot follow what he teaches or does. By contrast,
sedevacantists revolt against the pope’s authority as
such,
judge his interior culpability, and declare he is not Christ’s
vicar. This contrast is the difference between Catholicism on the
one hand, and revolution and (at least material) schism on the other
hand.
Catholics
must measure the pope’s words and deeds against the standard of
Catholic Tradition. We must accept what conforms to Tradition and
reject what conflicts with Tradition. Thus, sedevacantists are wrong
that, just because Catholics recognize the authority of the pope, we
must accept everything he says and does.
We
know that any dogma which was defined by the Church’s Extraordinary
Magisterium was already
true
and was always
a doctrine of the Faith,
even before the dogma was defined. In other words, the Church’s
extraordinary definition does not “make” a doctrine true (and
part of the Faith).
An
extraordinary definition of a doctrine of Faith merely gives
certitude to anyone in doubt concerning a truth which was already a
doctrine of the Catholic Faith. This is why the
First
Vatican Council declared: the Holy Ghost was promised to the
successors of Peter not
so that they might, by His revelation, make known some new
doctrine
.
Vatican I, Session 4, ch.4 (emphasis added).
Thus,
we know that the dogma Pope John XXII denied was always true and was
a doctrine of the Faith at
the time he denied this doctrine.
Likewise,
the post-conciliar popes have never admitted that they denied any
doctrine that they knew
they were required
to
believe
at that time in
order to be Catholic. So if we judge them at all, we judge that each
was pope in his turn and not a formal heretic.
An Explanation How the Catholic Church Continues to Possess A Full
Hierarchy even in these Times of Great Apostasy Against the Sedevacantist Argument that only a Valid Bishop Can Be Pope
because He is Bishop of Rome